论文信息 - Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts

Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts

In this chapter I discuss the definitions of complexity that emerged in different areas of science and their relevance to the economic theory of optimal contracts.

Suren Basov | S. Basov

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