论文信息 - Notions of A Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and WidgrÚn

Notions of A Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and WidgrÚn

These are critical remarks on Holler and WidgrUn (1999) and in particular on Holler's Public Good Index. The central idea is a distinction between two underlying pre-formal notions of a priori voting power: power as influence over the outcome, and power as expected relative share in a payoff.

Moshé Machover | M. Machover

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