A College Admissions Framework for distributed microgrids cooperation in smart grid

We study the application of the College Admissions Framework (CAF) for energy trading among distributed microgrids (MG). The aggregated power imbalance is used to classify MGs as buyers who have insufficient power generation and sellers who have excess power generation. Since who takes the role of applicants will result in different optimal solutions. Considering the practical market preferences, we design two forms of CAF where buyer MGs and seller MGs apply to trade with their counterparts respectively. Hence MGs are encouraged to form coalitions in order to minimize the total cost of power loss. We demonstrate the proposed CAF with variable energy quotas on a simplified MG energy trading scenario in the future. Unlike the non-cooperative model where the power loss is high and the state-of-the-art coalition formation game where the computational complexity is high, our methods show a performance improvement in active power loss while maintaining computational complexity.