Selective and authentic third-party distribution of XML documents

Third-party architectures for data publishing over the Internet today are receiving growing attention, due to their scalability properties and to the ability of efficiently managing large number of subjects and great amount of data. In a third-party architecture, there is a distinction between the Owner and the Publisher of information. The Owner is the producer of information, whereas Publishers are responsible for managing (a portion of) the Owner information and for answering subject queries. A relevant issue in this architecture is how the Owner can ensure a secure and selective publishing of its data, even if the data are managed by a third-party, which can prune some of the nodes of the original document on the basis of subject queries and access control policies. An approach can be that of requiring the Publisher to be trusted with regard to the considered security properties. However, the serious drawback of this solution is that large Web-based systems cannot be easily verified to be secure and can be easily penetrated. For these reasons, we propose an alternative approach, based on the use of digital signature techniques, which does not require the Publisher to be trusted. The security properties we consider are authenticity and completeness of a query response, where completeness is intended with regard to the access control policies stated by the information Owner. In particular, we show that, by embedding in the query response one digital signature generated by the Owner and some hash values, a subject is able to locally verify the authenticity of a query response. Moreover, we present an approach that, for a wide range of queries, allows a subject to verify the completeness of query results.