Machine Ethics and Modal Psychology

Machines are becoming more capable of substantively interacting with human beings within the confines of our complex social structures. Thought must be given to how their behavior might be regulated with respect to the norms and conventions by which we live. This is certainly true for the military domain, but is no less true for eldercare, health care, disaster relief and law enforcement; all areas where robotic systems are poised to make tremendous impact in the near future. But how should we inculcate sensitivity to normative considerations in the next generation of intelligent system? Any machine that we wish to actively take part in our moral practices must at least be sensitive to the peculiarities of human moral judgment. I will focus on some recent work by Joshua Knobe and colleagues that suggests that our everyday understanding of words like “cause,” “force,” and “intentional” (In the sense of intentional action rather than “aboutness” as a property assumed to be possessed of mental states.) is deeply wrapped up in both modal and normative cognition – that is, thoughts about non-actual possibilities and their interaction with norms. In this paper, I take a close look at a recent example given in Knobe and Szabo (Semant Pragmat 6(1):1–42, 2013) and offer a first-cut computational model, followed by a discussion of limitations and ideas for next steps.

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