论文信息 - Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters’ preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Francesco De Sinopoli | Giovanna Iannantuoni | F. Sinopoli | G. Iannantuoni

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