Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks

Influence models enable the modelling of the spread of ideas, opinions and behaviours in social networks. Bounded rationality in social network suggests that players make non optimum decisions due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a state or an idea can be regarded as being `rational', we propose an influence model based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social network. We employ the quantal response equilibrium model to incorporate the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. The bounded rationality of following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed would be negatively proportional to the distance from that node. This indicates that the closeness centrality would be the appropriate measure to place influencers in a social network. We argue that this model can be used in scenarios where there are multiple types of influencers and varying payoffs of adopting a state. We compare different seed placement mechanisms to compare and contrast the optimum method to minimise the existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. We ascertain that placing of opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds and the closeness centrality of the network would provide the maximum negative influence.

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