A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values

We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments.In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

[1]  E. H. Clarke.  Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[2]  Rajarshi Das,et al.  Agent-Human Interactions in the Continuous Double Auction , 2001, IJCAI.

[3]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[4]  A. Mas-Colell,et al.  Microeconomic Theory , 1995 .

[5]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges , 2001, IJCAI.

[6]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green , 1997 .

[7]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[8]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  The effect of false-name declarations in mechanism design: towards collective decision making on the Internet , 2000, Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.

[9]  M. Yokoo,et al.  The E ect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: New Fraud in Internet Auctions (Draft) * , 2000 .

[10]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[11]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[12]  Subhash Suri,et al.  Market Clearability , 2001, IJCAI.

[13]  Daniel Lehmann,et al.  Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities , 2001, EC '01.

[14]  W. K. Vickery,et al.  Counter-Speculation Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[15]  John Rust,et al.  The Double Auction Market , 1989 .

[16]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids , 2001, Proceedings 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.

[17]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocol Utilizing Greedy Allocation Based on Approximate Evaluation Values , 2002, PRIMA.

[18]  R. McAfee,et al.  A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .

[19]  Lawrence M. Ausubel.  An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects , 2004 .

[20]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation , 1998, Decis. Support Syst..

[21]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids , 2001, IJCAI.