A Multi-Agent Resource Negotiation for the Utilitarian Welfare

The multi-agent resource allocation problem is the negotiation of m resources among the n agents of a population, in order to maximize a social welfare function. Contrary to some former studies, the purpose is here neither to simply determine a socially optimal resource allocation nor to prove the existence of a transaction sequence leading to this optimum. The objective is to define the individual behavior of the agents which leads to an optimal resource allocation as an emergent phenomenon, based on any kind of contact network and on any utility value. With this intention, we study various agent behaviors in order to identify which one leads to an optimal resource allocation. After a study of different transaction types, we show that, among the set of studied transactions, the so called "social gift" transaction, is the most efficient one for solving the utilitarian resource allocation problem.

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