MANAGERIAL USE OF DISMISSAL: ORGANIZATIONAL‐LEVEL DETERMINANTS

Although much variation exists across organizations in the use of dismissal, little is known about the source of this variation. This study examines organizational-level determinants of the willingness of managers to attempt dismissal. Using survey data from HR managers, we measured organizational-level factors likely to be associated with the expected costs and benefits of dismissal. We then examined how these factors affect the willingness of line managers from corresponding organizations to attempt dismissal. As hypothesized, the results indicate that in most cases where threats to just cause were present, informal norms, disciplinary procedure restrictiveness, and appeal system characteristics all affected dismissal. Also, as was expected, where just cause for dismissal could unquestionably be established, dismissal was significantly influenced by informal norms but not by disciplinary procedure restrictiveness or appeal system characteristics. Finally, little consistent support was found for the hypothesized relationships between dismissal and human capital investment, performance pressures, monitoring costs, and labor market conditions.

[1]  R. Liden,et al.  Contextual and attributional influences on control decisions. , 1980 .

[2]  R. Rodgers,et al.  Discharge for Cause: History and Development in the United States , 1994 .

[3]  Jennifer A. Chatman,et al.  PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: A PROFILE COMPARISON APPROACH TO ASSESSING PERSON-ORGANIZATION FIT , 1991 .

[4]  Ian C. MacMillan,et al.  An Exploration of the Expertness of Outside Informants , 1993 .

[5]  H. Scullion,et al.  Deviancy Theory and Industrial Praxis: A Study of Discipline and Social Control in an Industrial Setting , 1982 .

[6]  L. James.  Aggregation Bias in Estimates of Perceptual Agreement. , 1982 .

[7]  Terence R. Mitchell,et al.  Attributions and Actions: A Note of Caution , 1982 .

[8]  J. E. Sheridan,et al.  Organizational Culture and Employee Retention , 1992 .

[9]  John Schaubroeck,et al.  A meta-analysis of self-supervisor, self-peer, and peer-supervisor ratings. , 1988 .

[10]  Linda Klebe Trevino,et al.  The Social Effects of Punishment in Organizations: A Justice Perspective , 1992 .

[11]  Dirk D. Steiner,et al.  Factors affecting supervisors' use of disciplinary actions following poor performance , 1994 .

[12]  T. R. Knight.  Feedback and Grievance Resolution , 1986 .

[13]  H. N. Wheeler,et al.  MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING ABOUT EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE: A POLICY‐CAPTURING APPROACH , 1990 .

[14]  L. Stern,et al.  Conducting Interorganizational Research Using Key Informants , 1993 .

[15]  H. P. Sims,et al.  Just and Unjust Punishment: Influences on Subordinate Performance and Citizenship , 1994 .

[16]  William D. Todor,et al.  Relationships Between Leader Reward and Punishment Behavior and Group Processes and Productivity , 1985 .

[17]  Perry A. Zirkel,et al.  The Consistency and Predictability of Grievance Arbitration Awards , 1990 .

[18]  Barton A. Weitz,et al.  Managing Marginal Employees: The Use of Warnings and Dismissals , 1980 .

[19]  Terence R. Mitchell,et al.  Dealing with Poor Performance: Supervisor Attributions and the Cost of Responding1 , 1985 .

[20]  James W. Smither,et al.  ATTRIBUTIONS FOR THE POORLY PERFORMING BLACKJACK DEALER: IN THE CARDS OR INABILITY? , 1986 .

[21]  Brian S. Klaas,et al.  The evaluation of disciplinary appeals in non-union organizations , 1993 .

[22]  Sheila M. Puffer,et al.  The impact of rewards and punishments in a social context: A laboratory and field experiment , 1989 .

[23]  David I. Levine,et al.  What do wages buy , 1993 .

[24]  D. Feldman,et al.  THE IMPACT OF APPEAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE ON DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS , 1994 .