论文信息 - Stackelberg Games and Multisectoral Economic Planning

Stackelberg Games and Multisectoral Economic Planning

The theory of open-loop Stackelberg games is applied to the planning and control of multisector economies. Using a simple real-world econometric model with a central coordinator and three sectors, it is shown that conflict reduction among any set of players would reduce suboptimality in the economy.

G. Anandalingam

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