Real-time testing platform for microgrid controllers against false data injection cybersecurity attacks

This paper proposes a real-time hardware-in-the loop (HIL) testing platform for microgrid cybersecurity analysis. The developed platform emulates the microgrid network, the distributed energy resources (DER) and their corresponding local controllers on a real-time digital simulator (RTDS). The main microgrid controller functions are implemented on a separate digital controller. The microgrid communication network is implemented in hardware and the messages exchanged are compliant with the IEC 61850 generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) messaging protocol. An impact assessment of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on the critical microgrid control functions, specifically, loss of load due to under frequency load shedding (UFLS) has been conducted. Mitigation solutions that enhance the resilience of the microgrid to FDI attacks have been proposed. Real-time simulation results are used to quantify the attack's impact and the mitigation scheme effectiveness on the dynamic frequency response of microgrids in terms of reliability metrics, including the amount of load lost, the frequency nadir and the time needed to reach frequency stability. A 25 kV distribution system adapted from a utility feeder and reconfigured as a microgrid has been used as the benchmark test system. Applicable utility grid codes and standards are considered throughout.

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