论文信息 - Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary ε-equilibria (ε > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

János Flesch | Koos Vrieze | Frank Thuijsman

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