Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] A. Schlesinger. Biography of a Nation of Joiners , 1944 .
[2] David H. Sacko,et al. The ~Ir!Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade , 2002 .
[3] Mary Caprioli,et al. Human Rights Rogues in Interstate Disputes, 1980–2001 , 2006 .
[4] H. D. Palmer,et al. Government competence, economic performance and endogenous election dates 1 Earlier versions of this , 2000 .
[5] Joel H. Silbey,et al. Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America , 1977 .
[6] Gabriella R. Montinola. Who Recovers First? , 2003 .
[7] A. Enterline,et al. Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy on Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity , 2005, The Journal of Politics.
[8] David Leblang. Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World , 1999 .
[9] N. Marinov. Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders , 2005 .
[10] Jon C. Pevehouse,et al. Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict , 2000, International Organization.
[11] Gary King,et al. Aggregation Among Binary, Count, and Duration Models: Estimating the Same Quantities from Different Levels of Data , 2008, Political Analysis.
[12] Jeffrey Pickering. Give Me Shelter: Reexamining Military Intervention and the Monadic Democratic Peace , 2002 .
[13] David Sobek. Machiavelli's Legacy: Domestic Politics and International Conflict , 2005 .
[14] Emilie Hafner-Burton. Positions INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS , SOCIAL NETWORKS , AND CONFLICT , 2005 .
[15] C. Volden,et al. States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program , 2006 .
[16] Kevin Arceneaux. The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship Between Economic Adversity and Turnout , 2003 .
[17] A. Drury,et al. Sanctions as Coercive Diploimacy: The U.S. President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions , 2001 .
[18] Jeffrey K. Staton,et al. State Delegate Selection Rules for Presidential Nominations, 1972–2000 , 2006, The Journal of Politics.
[19] Phillip Stalley. Environmental Scarcity and International Conflict , 2003 .
[20] J. Kalbfleisch,et al. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data: Kalbfleisch/The Statistical , 2002 .
[21] W. Greene,et al. 计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis , 2009 .
[22] Joanne Gowa,et al. Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade , 2004, International Organization.
[23] J. Kalbfleisch,et al. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data , 1980 .
[24] Jonathan N. Katz,et al. Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection , 1996, American Political Science Review.
[25] Rowland T. Berthoff. An Unsettled People. Social Order and Disorder in American History , 1971 .
[26] B. Russett,et al. Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads , 2002, The Journal of Politics.
[27] P. Feaver,et al. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force , 2002, American Political Science Review.
[28] E. Reinhardt,et al. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements , 2003, International Organization.
[29] Bruce D. Meyer. Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells , 1988 .
[30] Michael Colaresi,et al. Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation , 2002 .
[31] B. Simmons. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs , 2000, American Political Science Review.
[32] J. Hilbe. Logistic Regression Models , 2009 .
[33] Scott C. James. Patronage Regimes and American Party Development from ‘The Age of Jackson’ to the Progressive Era , 2005, British Journal of Political Science.
[34] A. Braithwaite. Location, Location, Location…Identifying Hot spots of International Conflict , 2005 .
[35] Paul D. Senese,et al. A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919–1992 , 2003 .
[36] Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier,et al. Duration models and proportional hazards in political science , 2001 .
[37] L. Román. The Institutional Environment , 1999 .
[38] William Reed,et al. Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace , 1996 .
[39] Laurence L. George,et al. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data , 2003, Technometrics.
[40] N. P. Gleditsch,et al. Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East? , 2005 .
[41] M. Mousseau. An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation , 2002 .
[42] C. Volden. The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits? , 2002 .
[43] B. Ripley,et al. Semiparametric Regression: Preface , 2003 .
[44] James H. Lebovic. Uniting for Peace? , 2004 .
[45] Timothy Nordstrom,et al. Economic Performance And Survival In New Democracies , 2003 .
[46] Marie Besançon. Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides , 2005 .
[47] M. Edwards. Investor Responses to IMF Program Suspensions: Is Noncompliance Costly? , 2005 .
[48] James N. G. Cauthen,et al. Courting Constituents: District Elections and Judicial Behavior on the Louisiana Supreme Court , 2003 .
[49] J. Mcpherson. Battle cry of freedom : the Civil War era , 1989 .
[50] W. Thompson,et al. Rivalries and the Democratic Peace in the Major Power Subsystem , 2001 .
[51] J. Goodliffe,et al. Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention against Torture , 2006, The Journal of Politics.
[52] A. Cameron,et al. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications , 2005 .
[53] Seung-Whan Choi,et al. No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate Disputes? , 2003 .
[54] M. Caprioli. Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict , 2005 .
[55] P. Fritz,et al. The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power Theory , 2004 .
[56] Bruce Russett,et al. Rule of Three, Let It Be? When More Really Is Better , 2005 .
[57] Demet Yalcin Mousseau. Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict? , 2001 .
[58] W. Reed,et al. The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads , 2001 .
[59] S. Domínguez-Almendros,et al. Logistic regression models. , 2011, Allergologia et immunopathologia.
[60] William Reed,et al. Information and Economic Interdependence , 2003 .
[61] B. Lai. The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises , 2004 .
[62] R. Sherman. Democracy and trade conflict , 2001 .
[63] Federico Poloni. Of Note , 2009 .
[64] Nathaniel N. Beck,et al. Beyond linearity by default: Generalized additive models , 1998 .
[65] Jocelyn Elise Crowley,et al. The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s , 2001 .
[66] Speak softly and carry a big stick , 2010 .
[67] Nathaniel Beck,et al. Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable , 1998 .
[68] Controlling Duration Dependence in Conflict Analyses: A Replication and Extension of "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations" , 1998 .
[69] Qiang Li,et al. All’s Well That Ends Well: A Reply to Oneal, Barbieri & Peters , 2003 .
[70] Glen S. Krutz,et al. Issues and Institutions: “Winnowing” in the U.S. Congress , 2005 .
[71] Christopher Zorn,et al. Estimating between‐ and within‐cluster covariate effects, with an application to models of international disputes , 2001 .
[72] Daniel Carpenter,et al. Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus , 2004, Political Analysis.
[73] Nathaniel Beck,et al. The Analysis of Binary Time-Series–Cross-Section Data and/or The Democratic Peace , 1998 .
[74] D.,et al. Regression Models and Life-Tables , 2022 .
[75] M. Mousseau. Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace , 2000 .
[76] Patrick J. McDonald,et al. Peace through Trade or Free Trade? , 2004 .
[77] Zvi Griliches,et al. Specification Error in Probit Models , 1985 .
[78] Glenn Palmer,et al. What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies , 2004 .
[79] Brandon C. Prins,et al. Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force , 2004 .
[80] P. Regan,et al. Opportunities to Fight , 2003 .
[81] T. Skocpol,et al. A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States , 2000, American Political Science Review.
[82] Luke Keele,et al. Taking Time Seriously , 2008 .
[83] Christopher R. Way,et al. Political Cycles and Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization , 2003 .
[84] Kenneth A. Schultz. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy , 2001 .
[85] Abel M. Rodrigues. Matrix Algebra Useful for Statistics , 2007 .
[86] David Sobek,et al. Violent Adolescence: State Development and the Propensity for Militarized Interstate Conflict , 2005 .
[87] Macartan Humphreys,et al. Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution , 2005 .
[88] L. Keele. Semiparametric Regression for the Social Sciences , 2008 .
[89] Curtis Peet,et al. Social Purpose and Militarized Disputes , 2000 .
[90] Richard Stoll,et al. The Liberal Peace and Conflictive Interactions: The Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1950-78 , 2002 .
[91] David A. Leblang,et al. Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter? , 2003 .
[92] S. R. Searle,et al. Matrix Algebra Useful for Statistics , 1982 .
[93] Bradford S. Jones,et al. Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries , 2005 .
[94] James H. Lebovic. The Limits of Reciprocity: Tolerance Thresholds in Superpower Conflict , 2003 .
[95] Steven J. Balla,et al. Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations , 2001 .
[96] Daniel M. Brinks,et al. Diffusion Is No Illusion , 2006 .
[97] Alexander H. Montgomery,et al. Power Positions , 2006 .
[98] Richard Tucker,et al. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict , 2001 .
[99] Christopher Zorn,et al. A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models , 2005, Political Analysis.
[100] Kevin A. Clarke. Nonparametric Model Discrimination in International Relations , 2003 .
[101] R. Tibshirani,et al. Generalized Additive Models , 1991 .
[102] Mark B. Stewart,et al. How Does the Benefit Effect Vary as Unemployment Spells Lengthen , 1993 .
[103] Gary King,et al. Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture , 2000, American Political Science Review.
[104] Cullen F. Goenner,et al. Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace , 2004 .
[105] Eric C. C. Chang,et al. Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation , 2005 .
[106] Juan J. Lanero Fernández,et al. Battle cry of freedom: the Civil War Era , 1990 .
[107] H. Buhaug,et al. Dangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May Not Be That Peaceful After All , 2005 .
[108] Mark Souva,et al. Institutions and International Cooperation , 2001 .
[109] J. Stein. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance , 2005, American Political Science Review.
[110] Caroline C. Beer,et al. Dictatorial Peace? , 2002, American Political Science Review.
[111] C. Volden,et al. The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies , 2004 .
[112] Strom C. Thacker,et al. The High Politics of IMF Lending , 1999, World Politics.
[113] M. Schemper,et al. A solution to the problem of separation in logistic regression , 2002, Statistics in medicine.
[114] Nils Petter Gleditsch,et al. A Diamond Curse? , 2005 .
[115] Christopher Gelpi,et al. Attracting Trouble , 2001 .
[116] Kenneth A. Schultz. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy: Index , 2001 .
[117] A. Schlesinger,et al. age of Jackson , 1945 .
[118] J. O'neal,et al. The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985 , 1997 .
[119] W. Thompson,et al. Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation , 2006 .
[120] C. Mooney,et al. The Influence of Values on Consensus and Contentious Morality Policy: U.S. Death Penalty Reform, 1956-82 , 2000, The Journal of Politics.
[121] Erik Melander,et al. Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict , 2005 .
[122] Jamie L. Carson,et al. AN EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS , 2001 .
[123] B. Efron. Logistic Regression, Survival Analysis, and the Kaplan-Meier Curve , 1988 .
[124] C. Mooney. Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion , 2001 .
[125] Kathy L. Powers. Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances , 2004 .
[126] Sangjoon Ka,et al. Ideology and Professionalism , 2002 .
[127] Quan Li,et al. Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict , 2001, International Organization.
[128] Jon C. W. Pevehouse,et al. Democratization and International Organizations , 2006, International Organization.
[129] Cecil J. Schneer,et al. The Search for Order , 1960 .
[130] “Lien On Me”: State Policy Innovation in Response to Paper Terrorism , 2005 .
[131] Hyung Min Kim,et al. The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the ‘Liberal Peace’, 1960-88 , 2005 .
[132] Barbara F. Walter. Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War , 2004 .
[133] Kathryn Dunn Tenpas,et al. Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates among Presidential Advisers, 1929-1997 , 2002, The Journal of Politics.
[134] Qiang Li,et al. Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict Debate , 2003 .
[135] James Lee Ray,et al. Explaining Interstate Conflict and War: What Should Be Controlled for? , 2003 .
[136] P. Senese. Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation , 2005 .
[137] R. Wiebe. The Search for Order, 1877-1920 , 1966 .
[138] D. S. Bennett,et al. Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads , 2000 .
[139] A. Enterline,et al. Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction , 2001 .
[140] R. Prentice,et al. Regression analysis of grouped survival data with application to breast cancer data. , 1978, Biometrics.
[141] Y. So,et al. A Tutorial on Logistic Regression , 1996 .
[142] P. Fritz,et al. Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances , 2004, The Journal of Politics.
[143] Todd S. Sechser,et al. Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen? , 2004 .
[144] Kevin Sweeney. The Severity of Interstate Disputes , 2003 .
[145] Peter F. Trumbore,et al. Rhetoric versus Reality , 2005 .
[146] D. S. Bennett,et al. Comparing Measures of Political Similarity , 2003 .
[147] William Reed,et al. Information, Power, and War , 2003 .
[148] Thomas J. Santner,et al. A note on A. Albert and J. A. Anderson's conditions for the existence of maximum likelihood estimates in logistic regression models , 1986 .
[149] W. Thompson,et al. The Democratic Peace and a Sequential, Reciprocal, Causal Arrow Hypothesis , 2004 .
[150] William J. Dixon,et al. Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements , 2002 .
[151] Witold J. Henisz. The institutional environment for infrastructure investment , 2002 .
[152] William Reed,et al. War and Rivalry among Great Powers , 2001 .
[153] Hal Brands,et al. The Search for Order , 2008 .
[154] N. P. Gleditsch,et al. Colonial War and the Democratic Peace , 2003 .
[155] John R. Oneal,et al. Measuring Interdependence and Its Pacific Benefits: A Reply to Gartzke & Li , 2003 .
[156] G. Chiozza. Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97 , 2002 .
[157] L. R. Reed,et al. A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation American Journal of Political Science 4 , 2000 .
[158] Rafael Reuveny,et al. Economic Globalization and Civil War , 2005, The Journal of Politics.
[159] D. Firth. Bias reduction of maximum likelihood estimates , 1993 .
[160] Helen V. Milner,et al. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries , 2005, International Organization.
[161] R. Michael Alvarez,et al. Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists , 2004 .
[162] A. Albert,et al. On the existence of maximum likelihood estimates in logistic regression models , 1984 .
[163] A. Stam,et al. A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War , 2000 .
[164] Quan Li,et al. War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization , 2003 .
[165] V. Krause. Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995 , 2004 .
[166] G. Davies. Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts , 2002 .
[167] David H. Bearce,et al. How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? , 2005 .
[168] Bruce Russett,et al. Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict , 1999 .
[169] Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer,et al. Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures , 2005 .
[170] R. Howard,et al. Policy Change and the State Courts: The Case of Education Finance Reform , 2001 .
[171] M. Benson. The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes , 2005 .