论文信息 - In praise of folly: a reply to Blome-Tillmann

In praise of folly: a reply to Blome-Tillmann

Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, D. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ryan, S. 1996. Does warrant entail truth? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 183-94. Sturgeon, S. 1993. The Gettier problem. Analysis 53: 156-64. Unger, P. 1968. An analysis of factual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 65: 157-70. Zagzebski, L. 1994. The inescapability of Gettier problems. Philosophical Quarterly 44: 65-73.

Stephen Kearns

[1] Linda Zagzebski,et al. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems , 2020, Epistemic Values.

[2] Michael Blome-Tillmann. The folly of trying to define knowledge , 2007 .

[3] Daniel,et al. Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy , 2003 .

[4] T. Merricks. More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth , 1997 .

[5] T. Merricks. Warrant Entails Truth , 1995 .

[6] S. Sturgeon. The Gettier Problem , 1993 .

[7] Alvin Plantinga,et al. Warrant: The Current Debate , 1993 .

[8] Peter Unger,et al. An Analysis of Factual Knowledge , 1968 .

[9] Alvin I. Goldman,et al. A Causal Theory of Knowing , 1967 .