Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach

The European Community (EC) is the most successful example of institutionalized international policy co-ordination in the modem world, yet there is little agreement about the proper explanation for its evolution. From the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht, the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation. The most fundamental task facing a theoretical account of European integration is to explain these bargains. Today many would revive neo-functionalism’s emphasis on sui generis characteristics of EC institutions, in particular the importance of unintended consequences of previous decisions and the capacity of supranational officials to provide leadership. This article joins the debate by reasserting the self-critique, advanced almost two decades ago by Emst Haas and other leading neo-functionalists, who

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