1 A Cardinal Voting : the Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility

In the article it is called the universality of the ordinal theory of social choice in question. It is shown that a voting exists that cannot be described on the base of ordinal theory, and to describe it the cardinal point of view is demanded. In absence of cardinal formalization of basic axioms of the social choice theory it is offered new formal mathematical machinery. It is proved that cardinal voting can satisfy Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternative, unrestricted domain, and at the same time it can be nondictatorship in disproof of Arrow's impossibility theorem.

[1]  R. Niemi.  The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting , 1984, American Political Science Review.

[2]  A. Tabarrok,et al.  President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election , 2001 .

[3]  Claude Hillinger,et al.  Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments , 2004 .

[4]  Nicolas de Condorcet.  Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite Des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite Des Voix , 2009 .

[5]  J. Pérez.  The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences , 2001 .

[6]  M. Satterthwaite.  Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[7]  L. A. Goodman,et al.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[8]  Douglas Muzzio,et al.  Approval voting , 1983 .

[9]  K. Arrow.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[10]  A. Sen,et al.  The Possibility of Social Choice , 1999 .

[11]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[12]  D. Saari.  Susceptibility to manipulation , 1990 .

[13]  Joaquín Pérez Ortega.  The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..

[14]  Harrie C. M. de Swart,et al.  Categoric and Ordinal Voting: An Overview , 2003, Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments.

[15]  Manipulability of a Voting , 2008 .

[16]  L. Cranor,et al.  Declared-strategy voting: an instrument for group decision-making , 1996 .

[17]  Warren D. Smith.  Range voting , 2000 .

[18]  R. Hahnel,et al.  Quiet revolution in welfare economics , 1990 .