Towards a verified component platform

This paper describes ongoing work on a new technique for reducing the cost of assurance of large software systems by building on a verified component platform. From a component architecture description, we automatically derive a formal model of the system and a semantics for the runtime behaviour of generated inter-component communication code. We can prove wellformedness properties of the architecture automatically and provide a framework in which users can reason about their component code and its behaviour. By leveraging the isolation properties and communication guarantees of a formally verified platform, correctness arguments for critical components will be able to be derived independently and composed together to reason about system-level correctness.

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