Temporal Logic with Preferences and Reasoning About Games

Game theory based semantics has provided good insights into the decidability and completeness of several modal logics [24]. On the other hand, we can formalise the language and reasoning used in game theory using appropriate types of modal logic [1, 3, 12–15, 23, 25]. This paper is concerned with the latter issue. The starting point in games is a set of players (agents) having certain strategies (decisions) and preferences on the game’s outcomes. Hence we have to represent both the game structure and the agents’ preference relations. When reasoning about the games, we wish to determine the properties that hold in the equilibrium to which the game naturally evolves.

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