Market-based pricing in grids: On strategic manipulation and computational cost

Grid technologies and the related concepts of utility computing and cloud computing enable the dynamic sourcing of computer resources and services, thus allowing enterprises to cut down on hardware and software expenses and to focus on key competencies and processes. Resources are shared across administrative boundaries, e.g. between enterprises and/or business units. In this dynamic and inter-organizational setting, scheduling and pricing become key challenges. Market mechanisms show promise for enhancing resource allocation and pricing in grids. Current mechanisms, however, are not adequately able to handle large-scale settings with strategic users and providers who try to benefit from manipulating the mechanism. In this paper, a market-based heuristic for clearing large-scale grid settings is developed. The proposed heuristic and pricing schemes find an interesting match between scalability and strategic behavior.

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