Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". The properties of this refinement are investigated and illustrated. A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of collective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

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