Breaking Virtual Memory Protection and the SGX Ecosystem with Foreshadow
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Thomas F. Wenisch | Frank Piessens | Yuval Yarom | Daniel Genkin | Mark Silberstein | Ofir Weisse | Raoul Strackx | Baris Kasikci | Marina Minkin | Jo Van Bulck | T. Wenisch | M. Silberstein | F. Piessens | Daniel Genkin | Y. Yarom | Baris Kasikci | Raoul Strackx | Ofir Weisse | Marina Minkin | Jo Van Bulck | Frank Piessens
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