论文信息 - Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing

Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing

In Smart City and Participatory Sensing initiatives the key concept is for user communities to contribute sensor information and form a body of knowledge that can be exploited by innovative applications and data analytics services. A key aspect in all such platforms is that sensor information is not free but comes at a cost. As a result, these platforms may suffer due to insufficient sensor information made publicly available if applications do not share efficiently the cost of the sensor information they consume.

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