论文信息 - Licensing a New Product with Non-Linear Contracts

Licensing a New Product with Non-Linear Contracts

This paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good. The licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good. We show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good. The equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee.

Yves Richelle | C. Erutku | Can Erutku | Y. Richelle

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