Domain Based Certification and Revocation

Certificate Authorities (CAs) are considered as a single point of failure in the design of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Adversaries can take the advantage of a compromised CA to issue certificates for any domains without being noticed by the domain owners. Another argument regarding PKI is the adoption of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) for publishing revoked certificates. It is difficult to synchronize related databases and provide a positive answer for certificate verification. Finally, the requirement of a globally unique name to identify a subject can be a fundamental flaw in applications. In response, many approaches have been proposed to use logs of certificates and CA history for certificate verification. In this study, we propose an alternative approach to limit the damage of a breached CA and improve the performance of certificate revocation with domain-based certification and revocation. With our approach, a unique CA is set up for each individual domain and is responsible for issuing and managing certificates for its domain. Information of certificate issuance and revocation is maintained locally at the corresponding CA to facilitate certificate verification and management. A subject is named with a local identifier and its domain. With this naming scheme, the requirement for a globally unique name can be resolved. Keywords-Public Key Infrastructure; PKI; PKIX; Public Key Certificate; Certification; Revocation

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