Is Little Red Riding Hood afraid of her grandmother? Cognitive vs. emotional response to a false belief

The essentials of a theory of mind are generally considered to be acquired around 4 years of age when the child succeeds in the standard ‘Maxi task’ (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, rational thought is not attained before 7-8 years of age in other domains of cognitive development. This study demonstrates that the mastery of mental state attribution using logical criteria is not reached before age 7-8 years when several assessments of a belief need to be coordinated. This is revealed by the dissociation between the cognitive and emotional assessments of a false belief which yield contradictory responses in most of the children who succeed on the standard task. The results were replicated in five experiments with a total of 254 children aged 3-8 years. The analysis of this decalage focuses on the autonomy of emotional attributions and the semi-mental and semi-behavioural structure of belief understanding implied in the standard task. An increase in processing capacity leads to a rational concept of belief around 7-8 years: this concept is called here ‘third-person', in opposition to ‘second-person’ which involves only an initial differentiation from the first-person point of view. Second-person depends on an opposition between the self and the other in terms of a single, modular evaluation of belief, whereas third-person depends on an integration among various assessments and provides a consistent and isotropic concept of belief.

[1]  J. Perner Understanding the Representational Mind , 1993 .

[2]  J. Bradmetz The form of intellectual development in children age 4 through 9 , 1996 .

[3]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[4]  H. Wimmer,et al.  Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception , 1983, Cognition.

[5]  Ted Ruffman,et al.  The belief-based emotion of surprise: the case for a lag in understanding relative to false belief , 1996 .

[6]  Marvin Minsky,et al.  Society of Mind: A Response to Four Reviews , 1991, Artif. Intell..

[7]  J. Fodor The Modularity of mind. An essay on faculty psychology , 1986 .

[8]  Patricia J. Brooks,et al.  Inference and Action in Early Causal Reasoning. , 1996 .

[9]  R. D. Kavanaugh,et al.  Young children's comprehension of pretend episodes: the integration of successive actions. , 1994, Child development.

[10]  O. G. Selfridge,et al.  Pandemonium: a paradigm for learning , 1988 .

[11]  J. Steven Reznick,et al.  Early Development of Executive Function: A Problem-Solving Framework , 1997 .

[12]  Gabriel Sandu Reasoning About Collective Goals , 1996, ATAL.

[13]  R. Chisholm,et al.  Brentano and Intrinsic Value , 1986 .

[14]  P. Harris,et al.  Young Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion , 1989 .

[15]  H. Wimmer,et al.  Ignorance versus false belief: a developmental lag in attribution of epistemic states , 1986 .

[16]  Josef Perner,et al.  Implicit Understanding of Belief , 1994 .

[17]  J. Piaget,et al.  La représentation de l'espace chez l'enfant , 1948 .