PrÊt À Voter: a Voter-Verifiable Voting System

¿¿¿¿¿¿Pre¿t a¿ Voter provides a practical approach to end-to-end verifiable elections with a simple, familiar voter-experience. It assures a high degree of transparency while preserving secrecy of the ballot. Assurance arises from the auditability of the election itself, rather than the need to place trust in the system components. The original idea has undergone several revisions and enhancements since its inception in 2004, driven by the identification of threats, the availability of improved cryptographic primitives, and the desire to make the scheme as flexible as possible. This paper presents the key elements of the approach and describes the evolution of the design and their suitability in various contexts. We also describe the voter experience, and the security properties that the schemes provide.

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