Connectionism, classical cognitivism and the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis

Abstract This paper discusses the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. Chalmers (1990, 1993) argues that a connectionist implementation of a classical cognitive architecture possesses a compositional semantics, and therefore undercuts Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument that connectionist networks cannot possess a compositional semantics. I argue that Chalmers argument misconstrues the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. This paper clarifies the distinction, and shows that while Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument survives Chalmers’ critique, it cannot be used to establish the irrelevance of neurophysiological implementation to cognitive modeling; some aspects of Chater and Oaksford's (1990) response to Fodor and Pylyshyn, though not all, are therefore cogent.

[1]  Hilary Putnam.  Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers , 1975 .

[2]  Andy Clark,et al.  Connectionism, Competence, and Explanation , 1990, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

[3]  Zenon W. Pylyshyn,et al.  Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science , 1984 .

[4]  P. Smolensky.  On the proper treatment of connectionism , 1988, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[5]  Eric L. Schwartz,et al.  Computational Neuroscience , 1993, Neuromethods.

[6]  James L. McClelland,et al.  Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition : Psychological and Biological Models , 1986 .

[7]  James L. McClelland,et al.  Explorations in parallel distributed processing: a handbook of models, programs, and exercises , 1988 .

[8]  N. Chater,et al.  Autonomy, implementation and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn , 1990, Cognition.

[9]  J. Elman.  Representation and structure in connectionist models , 1991 .

[10]  J. Fodor,et al.  Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work , 1990, Cognition.

[11]  Keith Butler,et al.  Towards a Connectionist Cognitive Architecture , 1991 .

[12]  Zenon W. Pylyshyn,et al.  Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis , 1988, Cognition.

[13]  David J. Chalmers,et al.  Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn were wrong , 1993 .

[14]  Berent Enç.  In Defense of the Identity Theory , 1983 .

[15]  Z. Pylyshyn.  Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science , 1980, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.