Differences between probability and frequency judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity☆

Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses.

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