Secret Key Generation within Peer-to-Peer Network Overlays

Key generation, a well known alternative to key distribution, allows two (or more) parties to concurrently generate the same secret key through their independent measurements of a mutually observable random information source. Within wireless networks the reciprocity of channel characterization measurements can be used to provide this required random source of information. This work enables key generation within peer-to-peer wired network by algorithmically extending the notion of wireless reciprocity into the wired domain. It is shown that for larger-scale Erdos-Renyi style peer-to-peer networks, the developed key generation approach remains secure when up to 75% of the peer-to-peer network's edge are assumed to be adversary controlled. in comparison to prior works, the proposed approach requires zero knowledge of either the network topology or the link capacities allowing it to be particularly well suited to today's global-scale peer-to-peer networks.

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