Understanding Positive Subjectivities Made Possible Online for Disabled People

The ideology of individualism underlying identity and psychology's focus on a visual ontology may serve to inhibit the social value of people with disabilities. The online medium with its capacity for textual self presentation presents a potentially new environment to operate within. This study set out to explore the psychological meaning of what it meant to be online for people with disabilities. Following the tradition of discursive psychology, we focused especially on constructions of how online experience provided alternative frameworks for social positioning. Participants were recruited from various disability organisations in New Zealand and were invited to take part in an online interview. Three key linguistic resources were identified: uncontaminated judgement, exhibiting strengths, and operating independently. Embedded within these resources was the idea that the physical and attitudinal barriers, disrupting the ability of people with disabilities to display their capabilities independent of a disabled identity, are eliminated online. Consequently, being judged outside of the constraints of a disabled identity affords people with disabilities the opportunity to enjoy a more socially valued subjectivity and a more positive identity. ********** People with disabilities have traditionally been undervalued in society. In this paper we argue that the ideology of individualism (Sampson, 1977; 1985; 1988), along with a reliance on visual ontology (Edwards & Potter, 1992) are powerful influences that have dominated both contemporary psychology and Western culture. We also suggest these influences restrict the opportunities people with disabilities have for gaining positive social identities and may further perpetuate their marginalisation in the social world. A Disabling Identity Social psychology has traditionally linked notions of 'self' and 'identity' with specific social practices. Rose (1994), for example, suggests that the social practice of individualism is regarded as being at the core of who we are. Similarly, Sampson (1977; 1985; 1988) points out that for many in the social sciences "self-contained individualism" now defines personhood. This can be encapsulated by the notion that one can possess something called an identity, denoted no less than an "essential center of the self" (Sparkes, 1997, p. 84). Independence, Watson (1998) suggests, is an integral part of identity. The ideal self is constructed as an entity in itself with distinct boundaries operating independently of others (Landrine, 1992). Shotter (1994) employs the term "possessive individualism" (p. 136) to describe the notion of individuals being the sole agent of their capacities. These characterisations mark a point in the tension between the social and the individual, in downplaying the social elements, which are inevitably involved in considerations of who we are and what we might be capable of. As Gergen (1991) suggests, the history of this allegiance to individualism is rooted in liberal humanism, wholeheartedly embraced at the beginning of the modern age in the 17th and 18th centuries. The ideology of individualism positions people as rational entities in full control of their destiny, with actions and achievements being directed by essentialist properties held at the core of their identity. We suggest individualism undermines the social value of people with disabilities because they frequently operate outside this ideology and outside this psychological model of identity. People with disabilities tend to operate interdependently. Differences in physical ability constrain their capacity to control the self and their environment. In some cases, particularly in relation to success and failure, the social context may wield far greater influence for people with disabilities. Focussing on independence and autonomy fails to consider our interdependent social relationships, which also powerfully impact on questions of who we are. …