The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes

We apply the information-theoretic anonymity metrics to continuous-time mixes, that individually delay messages instead of batching them. The anonymity of such mixes is measured based on their delay characteristics, and as an example the exponential mix (sg-mix) is analysed, simulated and shown to use the optimal strategy. We also describe a practical and powerful traffic analysis attack against connection based continuous-time mix networks, despite the presence of some cover traffic. Assuming a passive observer, the conditions are calculated that make tracing messages through the network possible.

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