论文信息 - ESS, NIS and GIS for multi‐player matrix game in single population

ESS, NIS and GIS for multi‐player matrix game in single population

In this paper, we distinguish the concept of global invader strategy (GIS) from that of neighborhood invader strategy (NIS), and discuss the concepts and the properties of ESS, NIS and GIS and relationship among them in the scenario of multi-player matrix game. We show that a GIS is always an ESS and GIS is unique for any multi-player. We also show that NIS is equivalent to ESS for pairwise game and there are some results in multi-player game different from those in pairwise game. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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