论文信息 - Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)

Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)

We propose a simple model of repeated games with private monitoring and time-varying information structures. We then obtain an example demonstrating that the set of achievable equilibrium payoffs may shrink when players' information regarding opponents' information structures is increased.

Scott Duke Kominers | Yuichiro Kamada | S. Kominers | Yuichiro Kamada

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