论文信息 - A new approach to the design of regulation in the presence of multiple objectives

A new approach to the design of regulation in the presence of multiple objectives

Abstract Many problems in regulation are characterized by multiple objectives on the part of the firm and the regulator. This paper develops a new approach for addressing such problems. The procedure relies on the use of transferable property rights. Examples drawn from the fields of business management and regulation are used to illustrate the idea. After presenting the basic theory, the paper examines how the theory can be implemented and tested.

Robert W. Hahn

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