Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games

The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.

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