The Monty Python Flying Circus of Money Laundering and the Question of Proportionality

This chapter explores the approach to AML, mapping its evolution from the US and the war on drugs in the early 1980s through to the establishment of the FATF and global regulatory framework that we have in place today. We unpick the figures behind the threat narrative and the size of the money laundering problem, highlighting the lack of clarity over what is or is not being counted. Drawing data from the mutual evaluation process and its associated costs, we expose that the severity of the existing anti-money laundering policy fails the basic test of proportionality.

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