In both theoretical and applied contexts, the concept of autonomy has assumed increasing importance in recent normative philosophical discussion. Given various problems to be clarified or resolved, the author characterises the concept by first setting out conditions of adequacy. The author then links the notion of autonomy to the identification and critical reflection of an agent upon his or her first-order motivations. It is only when a person identifies with the influences that motivate him or her, assimilates them to himself or herself, that he or she is autonomous. In addition, this process of identification must itself meet certain procedural constraints. Keywords: individual autonomy; first and second order motivation; moral philosophy (Published: 3 July 2015) Citation: NordSTEP 2015, 1: 28479 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/nstep.v1.28479
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