Autonomous Artificial Intelligence and Uncontemplated Hazards: Towards the Optimal Regulatory Framework

The issue of super-intelligent artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to attract ever more attention in economics, law, sociology and philosophy studies. A new industrial revolution is being unleashed, and it is vital that lawmakers address the systemic challenges it is bringing while regulating its economic and social consequences. This paper sets out recommendations to ensure informed regulatory intervention covering potential uncontemplated AI-related risks. If AI evolves in ways unintended by its designers, the judgment-proof problem of existing legal persons engaged with AI might undermine the deterrence and insurance goals of classic tort law, which consequently might fail to ensure optimal risk internalisation and precaution. This paper also argues that, due to identified shortcomings, the debate on the different approaches to controlling hazardous activities boils down to a question of efficient ex ante safety regulation. In addition, it is suggested that it is better to place AI in the existing legal categories and not to create a new electronic legal personality.

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