Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War

Abstract : This report describes how Russia, China, and Iran have used measures short of war to exploit and stretch U.S. strategic thresholds for high-order conventional or nuclear conflict in eastern Europe, east Asia, and the Middle East. Measures short of war include every action and tool at a nation-states disposal that might further the states interests without crossing the threshold into high-order and often-unmanageable interstate war. These range from simple negotiation to assassination to the use of military special operations forces. If applied in the right combinations, measures short of war can be used to achieve strategic objectives or to create room for further maneuvers against other, competing nation-states. Cunning and aggressive application of these measures can allow a nation-stateincluding the United Statesto reshape, or stretch, the negotiated, stated, or tacit thresholds for aggressive national behavior.

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