Credence goods monopolists

With a credence good, consumers are never sure about the extent of the good that they actually need. Experts such as doctors and lawyers, as well as auto mechanics and appliance service-persons (the sellers) not only provide the services, but also act as the expert in determining the customer's requirements. This information asymmetry between buyers and the seller creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat. We analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non-fraudulent seller behavior.

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