Dining Cryptographers with 0.924 Verifiable Collision Resolution

The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple access channel in whichsenders and recipients are anonymous. A problem is that a malicious participant can disrupt commu-nication by deliberately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining cryptogra-phers protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maximum stable throughput of 0.924 messagesper round and which allows to easily detect disruptors.

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