Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work

T h e worlds major powers and the United Nations (UN) are increasingly using economic sanctions to achieve international political objectives. For example, the United Nations recently imposed sanctions to force Iraq out of Kuwait, to compel Serbia to stop aiding the Bosnian rebels, to topple the Haitian military, and to end apartheid. Similarly, the United States has threatened to punish China economically for human rights abuses and has tightened its long-standing embargo of Cuba. From 1991 to 1994 the UN Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions eight times, compared to only twice from 1945 to 1990.' A critical signal that faith in economic sanctions continues to grow was given in January 1995, when then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prop s e d the creation of a new UN agency to monitor the implementation of economic sanctions and to assess in advance the likely effectiveness of contemplated sanctions? Military instruments are often thought to be the only effective means for achieving ambitious foreign policy goals like taking or defending territory, altering a state's military behavior, and changing a state's regime or internal political structure. Since World War I, however, economic sanctions have come to be viewed as the liberal alternative to war.3 From crises involving the League of Nations before World War I1 to disputes involving the United Nations today, proponents typically argue that economic sanctions can often be as effective as military force and are more humane. As David Baldwin has stated, "Reasonable people may differ with respect to the utility of