The effects of need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining.

Abstract A 2×3 factorial experiment was employed to study the conditions under which a bargainer will “cut off his nose to save his face.” Face saving was operationalized as choosing to retaliate at costs to self rather than to maximize “own” outcomes following public humiliation. The need to maintain face was induced by telling subjects they would be observed by an “audience” (peers) while participating in a modification of Deutsch and Krauss's two-person bargaining game. A programmed stooge systematically exploited them during the first ten trials of the experiment. Next they received audience “feedback” informing them that they (a) looked foolish and weak, or (b) looked good—even though exploited—because they “played fair.” (Control subjects received no feedback.) In the second ten trials subjects could choose (a) graduated retaliation, at increasing “costs,” or (b) to disregard their previous exploitation and substantially increase their outcomes. Another manipulation involved telling subjects that the other either knew or didn't know their costs for retaliation. The results were clear. Humiliated subjects were more likely to retaliate, with greater severity, than those who—though similarly exploited—received favorable feedback. Importantly, retaliation occurred although it required sacrificing available outcomes. When subjects knew that the other participant knew their costs, retaliation was suppressed.