论文信息 - The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

Abstract With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named “Simple Sequential Auctions.”Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82.

Giuseppe Lopomo

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