Infochain: A Decentralized System for Truthful Information Elicitation

Incentive mechanisms play a pivotal role in collecting correct and reliable information from self-interested agents. Peer-prediction mechanisms are game-theoretic mechanisms that incentivize agents for reporting the information truthfully, even when the information is unverifiable in nature. Traditionally, a trusted third party implements these mechanisms. We built Infochain, a decentralized system for information elicitation. Infochain ensures transparent, trustless and cost-efficient collection of information from self-interested agents without compromising the game-theoretical guarantees of the peer-prediction mechanisms. In this paper, we address various non-trivial challenges in implementing these mechanisms in Ethereum and provide experimental analysis.

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