论文信息 - The core of a further m-sided assignment game - 字舞流文

The core of a further m-sided assignment game

Abstract A further generalization of the Shapley-Shubik housing market is considered in which there are m types of individuals instead of two. This is different from the generalization of Quint. These games can have empty cores.

Jorge Oviedo | Ezio Marchi | J. Oviedo | E. Marchi

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