Ist die Vergütung von Managern im Zeitablauf flexibler geworden?

SummaryAcademic researchers as well as business media criticise the relative high share of fixed salaries of total remuneration of German top management. This study analyses the development of management compensation over ten years (1987–1996). The data is based on published information from 149 firms, which leads to overall 1093 observations. Evidence is found for the hypothesis, that management compensation has become more profit-related over time. In addition there is evidence that the “Aufsichtsrate” fail to penalize the executive boards for poor financial performance.

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