Lightweight hardware architectures for fault diagnosis schemes of efficiently-maskable cryptographic substitution boxes

As we are close to the advent of quantum computing capability, the potential use of resistant algorithms, i.e., code-based, lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate-quadratic-equations, and symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms, depends on many sensitive factors including resistance against natural and malicious faults. Active side-channel analysis attacks (SCAs) such as fault analysis attacks and passive ones, e.g., power analysis attacks, have been effective to compromise algorithmically-secure crypto-solutions including the emerging lightweight block ciphers. Nevertheless, one can provide fault diagnosis approaches to ameliorate the former and use efficient masking mechanisms for the latter. There has been recent work to account for power analysis attacks resistivity before developing new lightweight block ciphers; nonetheless, in this paper, we present error detection approaches for such ciphers and present insights towards future directions for potential, combined power and fault analysis attacks resistivity as a major deciding factor in developing SCA-resistant lightweight block ciphers. Through error simulations, the theoretical back-bone of the presented error detection scheme for a lightweight block cipher case study is benchmarked. The proposed design factor can be tailored based on the required security, fault resistivity, and overhead tolerance of both classical and post-quantum cryptography.

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