Dynamics of a 2D Piecewise Linear Braess Paradox Model: Effect of the Third Partition

In this work, we investigate the dynamics of a piecewise linear 2D discontinuous map modeling a simple network showing the Braess paradox. This paradox represents an example in which adding a new route to a specific congested transportation network makes all the travelers worse off in terms of their individual travel time. In the particular case in which the modeled network corresponds to a binary choice situation, the map is defined on two partitions and its dynamics has already been described. In the general case corresponding to a ternary choice, a third partition appears leading to significantly more complex bifurcation structures formed by border collision bifurcations of stable cycles with points located in all three partitions. Considering a map taking a constant value on one of the partitions, we provide a first systematic description of possible dynamics for this case.

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